From 1ff471299e07d02f7af07529b10e069b0d73365a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Javier Casares Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2026 14:36:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] v1.6.8 --- changelog.txt | 24 +++++ includes/class-email-notifications.php | 37 +++++++ includes/login/class-email-code-sender.php | 50 +++++++++ includes/login/class-login-form-manager.php | 111 ++++++++++++++++++-- readme.txt | 23 ++-- robotstxt-2fa.php | 4 +- uninstall.php | 1 + vendor/composer/installed.php | 4 +- 8 files changed, 230 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/changelog.txt b/changelog.txt index 67c38b2..c55e23f 100644 --- a/changelog.txt +++ b/changelog.txt @@ -1,5 +1,29 @@ == Changelog == += 1.6.8 = + +_Release date: 2026-09-21_ + +**Added** + +* Administrator visibility when email delivery fails: failed verification-code deliveries record a marker and administrators see a persistent, self-clearing notice ("2FA: email delivery is failing…") in wp-admin and the network admin, since forced-email users cannot sign in while delivery is broken. The notice disappears automatically once a code is delivered successfully. + +**Fixed** + +* "We could not determine which account you are trying to access" during verification: the pending-stage token was stored in a transient, which external object caches (Redis/Memcached) can evict at any time, killing live verification sessions. Tokens now live in a persistent option map (capped, pruned, consumed on success, cleaned on uninstall) and the error message now says the session expired and asks the user to sign in again. + +**Compatibility** + +* WordPress: 5.6 – 7.1 +* PHP: 8.0 – 8.5 + +**Tests** + +* PHP Coding Standards: PHP_CodeSniffer 3.13.6 / WPCS 3.4.1 — 0 errors +* PHPStan: level 9 — 0 errors +* PHPCompatibility: 8.0–8.5 — 0 issues +* PHPUnit: 9.6.36 — 110 tests, 220 assertions + = 1.6.7 = _Release date: 2026-09-17_ diff --git a/includes/class-email-notifications.php b/includes/class-email-notifications.php index 67bfdaa..8db31b1 100644 --- a/includes/class-email-notifications.php +++ b/includes/class-email-notifications.php @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ namespace Robotstxt\TwoFA; +use Robotstxt\TwoFA\Login\Email_Code_Sender; use Robotstxt\TwoFA\User\Two_Factor_Config; if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) { @@ -61,6 +62,42 @@ class Email_Notifications { add_action( self::DIGEST_CRON_HOOK, array( $this, 'send_digest' ) ); add_filter( 'cron_schedules', array( $this, 'add_cron_schedules' ) ); add_action( 'init', array( $this, 'maybe_schedule_digest' ) ); + add_action( 'admin_notices', array( $this, 'render_delivery_failure_notice' ) ); + add_action( 'network_admin_notices', array( $this, 'render_delivery_failure_notice' ) ); + } + + /** + * Warn administrators while verification-code delivery is failing. + * + * When a role forces email verification and wp_mail() fails, users are + * locked out at the login challenge with an error that points them at + * their administrator — while the real fault is the site's mail + * configuration. The failure marker is written by + * {@see Email_Code_Sender} on failed delivery and removed automatically + * once a code is delivered successfully. + * + * @since 1.6.8 + * + * @return void + */ + public function render_delivery_failure_notice(): void { + if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) { + return; + } + + $failure = get_option( Email_Code_Sender::MAIL_FAILURE_OPTION, array() ); + + if ( ! is_array( $failure ) || empty( $failure['at'] ) ) { + return; + } + ?> +
+

+ + +

+
+ user_email, $email_subject, $message, $headers ) ) { + $this->record_mail_failure( $user->user_email ); + return false; } + $this->clear_mail_failure(); + $this->user_settings_repository->store_email_challenge( $user->ID, $code, $expires ); return true; } + /** + * Record a failed verification-code delivery for administrator visibility. + * + * When a role forces email verification, a failing wp_mail() locks users + * out of their accounts with no site-side signal. Store the failure so an + * admin notice can explain the root cause. + * + * @since 1.6.8 + * + * @param string $to Intended recipient. + * + * @return void + */ + private function record_mail_failure( string $to ): void { + $existing = get_option( self::MAIL_FAILURE_OPTION, array() ); + $record = is_array( $existing ) ? $existing : array(); + + update_option( + self::MAIL_FAILURE_OPTION, + array( + 'at' => time(), + 'to' => $to, + 'count' => ( isset( $record['count'] ) && is_numeric( $record['count'] ) ? (int) $record['count'] : 0 ) + 1, + ), + false + ); + } + + /** + * Clear the delivery failure marker after a successful delivery. + * + * @since 1.6.8 + * + * @return void + */ + private function clear_mail_failure(): void { + delete_option( self::MAIL_FAILURE_OPTION ); + } + /** * Verify a submitted code against the stored challenge. * diff --git a/includes/login/class-login-form-manager.php b/includes/login/class-login-form-manager.php index 3f00773..f575ddd 100644 --- a/includes/login/class-login-form-manager.php +++ b/includes/login/class-login-form-manager.php @@ -85,9 +85,21 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { private const FIELD_METHOD = 'robotstxt_2fa_method'; /** - * Transient key prefix for pending-stage tokens. + * Option key storing the pending-stage token map. + * + * Maps token => array( user ID, expiry ). Persistent storage instead of a + * transient: external object caches can evict transients at any time, + * which would kill live verification stages and lock users out with + * "We could not determine which account you are trying to access." */ - private const PENDING_TRANSIENT_PREFIX = 'robotstxt_2fa_stage_'; + private const PENDING_OPTION = 'robotstxt_2fa_pending_stages'; + + /** + * Maximum concurrent pending-stage tokens kept in the map. + * + * The map is pruned on every write; the cap bounds its size. + */ + private const PENDING_MAX_TOKENS = 20; /** * Pending-stage token TTL in seconds — matches WP nonce lifetime (24 h). @@ -649,7 +661,7 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { $authenticated_user = $this->resolve_pending_user(); if ( null === $authenticated_user ) { - return new \WP_Error( 'robotstxt_2fa_unknown_user', __( 'We could not determine which account you are trying to access.', 'robotstxt-2fa' ) ); + return new \WP_Error( 'robotstxt_2fa_unknown_user', __( 'Your verification session expired or could not be found. Please sign in again.', 'robotstxt-2fa' ) ); } // Brute-force: check if the account is currently locked out. @@ -753,7 +765,7 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { // Consume the pending token so it cannot be replayed. $pending_token = $this->get_requested_pending_token(); if ( '' !== $pending_token ) { - delete_transient( self::PENDING_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $pending_token ); + $this->consume_pending_token( $pending_token ); } $this->user_settings_repository->record_last_verification( @@ -1333,21 +1345,99 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { /** * Issue an opaque pending-stage token that maps to a user ID. * - * Stores the user ID in a short-lived transient so the login username - * is never transmitted in the URL query string. + * Stores the token in a persistent option map (see PENDING_OPTION) so the + * login username is never transmitted in the URL query string and object + * cache eviction cannot kill a live stage. * * @since 1.3.0 + * @since 1.6.8 Stored in a persistent option map instead of a transient. * * @param int $user_id User identifier. * * @return string 32-character alphanumeric token. */ private function issue_pending_token( int $user_id ): string { + $tokens = $this->get_pending_token_map(); + $now = time(); + + foreach ( $tokens as $existing_token => $data ) { + if ( $data['e'] <= $now ) { + unset( $tokens[ $existing_token ] ); + } + } + $token = wp_generate_password( 32, false, false ); - set_transient( self::PENDING_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token, $user_id, self::PENDING_TTL ); + + $tokens[ $token ] = array( + 'u' => $user_id, + 'e' => $now + self::PENDING_TTL, + ); + + if ( count( $tokens ) > self::PENDING_MAX_TOKENS ) { + uasort( + $tokens, + static function ( array $a, array $b ): int { + return (int) $a['e'] <=> (int) $b['e']; + } + ); + + $tokens = array_slice( $tokens, -self::PENDING_MAX_TOKENS, null, true ); + } + + update_option( self::PENDING_OPTION, $tokens, false ); + return $token; } + /** + * Retrieve the raw pending-stage token map stored in the database. + * + * @since 1.6.8 + * + * @return array Token => user ID + expiry. + */ + private function get_pending_token_map(): array { + $raw = get_option( self::PENDING_OPTION, array() ); + + if ( ! is_array( $raw ) ) { + return array(); + } + + $tokens = array(); + + foreach ( $raw as $token => $data ) { + if ( is_string( $token ) && is_array( $data ) && isset( $data['u'], $data['e'] ) && is_numeric( $data['u'] ) && is_numeric( $data['e'] ) ) { + $tokens[ $token ] = array( + 'u' => (int) $data['u'], + 'e' => (int) $data['e'], + ); + } + } + + return $tokens; + } + + /** + * Remove a consumed pending-stage token from the map. + * + * @since 1.6.8 + * + * @param string $token Token to consume. + * + * @return void + */ + private function consume_pending_token( string $token ): void { + $tokens = $this->get_pending_token_map(); + + if ( ! isset( $tokens[ $token ] ) ) { + return; + } + + unset( $tokens[ $token ] ); + + update_option( self::PENDING_OPTION, $tokens, false ); + } + /** * Retrieve the raw pending-stage token from the current request. * @@ -1373,6 +1463,7 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { * Resolve the pending-stage token to its associated WP_User. * * @since 1.3.0 + * @since 1.6.8 Reads the persistent token map instead of a transient. * * @return \WP_User|null Null when no valid token is present. */ @@ -1383,13 +1474,13 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { return null; } - $user_id_raw = get_transient( self::PENDING_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token ); + $data = $this->get_pending_token_map()[ $token ] ?? null; - if ( ! is_numeric( $user_id_raw ) ) { + if ( null === $data || $data['e'] <= time() ) { return null; } - $user = get_user_by( 'ID', (int) $user_id_raw ); + $user = get_user_by( 'ID', $data['u'] ); return $user instanceof \WP_User ? $user : null; } diff --git a/readme.txt b/readme.txt index fd801dc..1b69ea6 100644 --- a/readme.txt +++ b/readme.txt @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Tags: security, two-factor authentication, login, otp Requires at least: 5.6 Tested up to: 7.0 Requires PHP: 8.0 -Stable tag: 1.6.7 +Stable tag: 1.6.8 License: GPLv3 or later License URI: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html @@ -59,6 +59,18 @@ Yes. Activate the plugin at the network level. Network administrators can set an == Changelog == += 1.6.8 = + +_Release date: 2026-09-21_ + +**Added** + +* Administrator visibility when email delivery fails: failed verification-code deliveries record a marker and administrators see a persistent, self-clearing notice ("2FA: email delivery is failing…") in wp-admin and the network admin, since forced-email users cannot sign in while delivery is broken. + +**Fixed** + +* "We could not determine which account you are trying to access" during verification: the pending-stage token was stored in a transient, which external object caches (Redis/Memcached) can evict at any time, killing live verification sessions. Tokens now live in a persistent option map and the error message asks the user to sign in again. + = 1.6.7 = _Release date: 2026-09-17_ @@ -75,15 +87,6 @@ _Release date: 2026-09-17_ * Forced-enrollment warning on the profile 2FA section: when a user's role enforces 2FA but they have no verification method configured yet, the 2FA section of their profile (wp-admin and the frontend shortcode) opens with a warning notice asking them to activate at least one method. While a grace period is active, the notice appends the remaining days. -= 1.6.5 = - -_Release date: 2026-09-17_ - -**Fixed** - -* Fatal error on the login screen with newer WordPress versions: the `login_message` filter can deliver null when no message is set (observed on WordPress 7.x with PHP 8.4, TypeError on a plain visit to wp-login.php). The message callback now accepts `string|null` and coalesces null to an empty string. -* Hardened all externally-fed filter callbacks against null payloads: the four `authenticate` callbacks now accept `string|null` credentials (custom REST/SSO endpoints are known to apply the filter with null), and the `wp_redirect` filter callback coalesces a null location. - = Previous versions = For the full changelog see the [changelog](https://www.robotstxt.software/plugins/robotstxt-2fa/) page. diff --git a/robotstxt-2fa.php b/robotstxt-2fa.php index 1fb6b43..6e966cc 100644 --- a/robotstxt-2fa.php +++ b/robotstxt-2fa.php @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Plugin URI: https://www.robotstxt.software/plugins/robotstxt-2fa/ * Update URI: https://www.robotstxt.software/plugins/robotstxt-2fa/ * Description: Adds two-factor authentication to the WordPress login flow. - * Version: 1.6.7 + * Version: 1.6.8 * Author: ROBOTSTXT * Author URI: https://www.robotstxt.software/ * Text Domain: robotstxt-2fa @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) { } if ( ! defined( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_VERSION' ) ) { - define( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_VERSION', '1.6.7' ); + define( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_VERSION', '1.6.8' ); } if ( ! defined( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_FILE' ) ) { diff --git a/uninstall.php b/uninstall.php index 84312a2..650e47e 100644 --- a/uninstall.php +++ b/uninstall.php @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ if ( ! robotstxt_2fa_should_delete_data() ) { delete_option( 'robotstxt_2fa_settings' ); delete_option( 'robotstxt_2fa_failed_log' ); delete_option( 'robotstxt_2fa_geoip_status' ); +delete_option( 'robotstxt_2fa_pending_stages' ); delete_site_option( 'robotstxt_2fa_settings' ); // Clear the GeoIP auto-download cron event. diff --git a/vendor/composer/installed.php b/vendor/composer/installed.php index 3b5c785..102d091 100644 --- a/vendor/composer/installed.php +++ b/vendor/composer/installed.php @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ 'name' => 'robotstxt/robotstxt-2fa', 'pretty_version' => 'dev-main', 'version' => 'dev-main', - 'reference' => '2b6e97d03ffbc5f7734bbd30413c979f50de3d15', + 'reference' => '70737383aa72a4fb75363c9d084ec3a7112f8d3b', 'type' => 'wordpress-plugin', 'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../', 'aliases' => array(), @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ 'robotstxt/robotstxt-2fa' => array( 'pretty_version' => 'dev-main', 'version' => 'dev-main', - 'reference' => '2b6e97d03ffbc5f7734bbd30413c979f50de3d15', + 'reference' => '70737383aa72a4fb75363c9d084ec3a7112f8d3b', 'type' => 'wordpress-plugin', 'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../', 'aliases' => array(),