From b5d03b7f81024aaacdb7d5bfff45577344b158b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Javier Casares Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2026 18:43:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] v1.6.11 --- changelog.txt | 22 +++++ includes/login/class-login-form-manager.php | 94 +++++++++++++++++++-- readme.txt | 23 +++-- robotstxt-2fa.php | 4 +- vendor/composer/installed.php | 4 +- 5 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/changelog.txt b/changelog.txt index 252f148..849c0d6 100644 --- a/changelog.txt +++ b/changelog.txt @@ -1,5 +1,27 @@ == Changelog == += 1.6.11 = + +_Release date: 2026-11-04_ + +**Fixed** + +* The 2FA verification screen is no longer hijacked on membership sites that redirect the WordPress login away from wp-login.php (confirmed live on Restrict Content Pro 4.0.9 with "Hijack Login URL" enabled and the login at a custom account page such as /mi-cuenta/). RCP implements the hijack twice: through the login_url filter (already handled since 1.6.4) and — new finding — through a `login_form_login` redirect that bounces every default-action wp-login.php request to the membership page, dropping the 2FA query arguments. Stage requests now carry a dedicated `action=robotstxt-2fa-verify` (declared to WordPress via a registered `login_form_` hook, preserved on submission through a hidden field), so they run core's login branch without firing `login_form_login`, out of reach of that redirect pattern in any plugin. Verified end to end on the reported replica: password at the membership page → verification screen renders → valid code → user lands back on the membership page, logged in. +* Users logging in from front-end forms (membership/account pages) now return to the page they logged in from after completing 2FA instead of landing in wp-admin: when the request carries no core `redirect_to`, the challenge falls back to the raw HTTP referer, validated to be same-host and not an admin or login URL (foreign and admin referers are ignored). + +**Compatibility** + +* WordPress: 7.0 - 7.2 +* PHP: 8.3 - 8.6 + +**Tests** + +* PHP Coding Standards: PHP_CodeSniffer 3.13.6 / WPCS 3.4.1 — 0 errors +* PHPStan: level max (10), no baseline — 0 errors +* PHPCompatibility: 8.3-8.6 — 0 issues +* PHPUnit: 9.6.38 — 125 tests, 236 assertions (PHP 8.6.0RC3 and 8.3.36) +* Live end-to-end on the reported site replica (WordPress 7.1.4 + Restrict Content Pro 4.0.9): full login → 2FA → return-to-page cycle, MariaDB 11.8.9 + = 1.6.10 = _Release date: 2026-11-03_ diff --git a/includes/login/class-login-form-manager.php b/includes/login/class-login-form-manager.php index d43e783..e9ad577 100644 --- a/includes/login/class-login-form-manager.php +++ b/includes/login/class-login-form-manager.php @@ -111,6 +111,26 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { */ private const FIELD_STAGE_TOKEN = 'robotstxt_2fa_stage_token'; + /** + * Core login action used for verification-stage requests. + * + * The wp-login.php script validates the `action` parameter against its + * known actions plus any with a registered `login_form_{action}` hook, + * and resets unknown ones to `login`. Membership plugins (Restrict + * Content Pro's "Hijack Login URL", and others with the same pattern) hook + * `login_form_login` to bounce the default login action to their own + * page — which would prevent the verification screen from ever rendering. + * A dedicated action keeps stage requests out of that hook while still + * running core's default login branch (form rendering + credential + * processing). + */ + private const STAGE_ACTION = 'robotstxt-2fa-verify'; + + /** + * Query parameter carrying the core login action. + */ + private const QUERY_ACTION = 'action'; + /** * Identifier for the verification stage. */ @@ -246,6 +266,25 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { add_filter( 'authenticate', array( $this, 'maybe_complete_verification' ), 5, 3 ); add_filter( 'authenticate', array( $this, 'enforce_verification_challenge' ), 30, 3 ); add_action( 'init', array( $this, 'maybe_remove_altcha_interceptor' ), 0 ); + add_action( 'login_form_' . self::STAGE_ACTION, array( $this, 'stage_action_noop' ) ); + } + + /** + * No-op callback for the dedicated verification-stage login action. + * + * Core only accepts non-default `action` values that have a + * `login_form_{action}` hook registered; registering this callback + * declares the stage action so stage requests are not reset to the + * default `login` action — and therefore are not hijacked by + * third-party `login_form_login` redirects (membership plugins that + * move the login form to their own page). + * + * @since 1.6.11 + * + * @return void + */ + public function stage_action_noop(): void { + // Intentionally empty; registration alone declares the action. } /** @@ -421,6 +460,10 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { printf( '', esc_attr( self::FIELD_STAGE_TOKEN ), esc_attr( $stage_token ) ); } + // Keep the dedicated stage action on submission so third-party + // login_form_login redirects cannot bounce the verification POST. + printf( '', esc_attr( self::QUERY_ACTION ), esc_attr( self::STAGE_ACTION ) ); + wp_nonce_field( self::LOGIN_NONCE_ACTION, self::LOGIN_NONCE_FIELD ); ?>

@@ -973,9 +1016,10 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { $stage_token = wp_create_nonce( self::STAGE_TOKEN_ACTION . '|' . $user->ID ); $query_args = array( - self::QUERY_STAGE => self::STAGE_VERIFY, - self::QUERY_METHOD => $method, - self::QUERY_PENDING => $this->issue_pending_token( $user->ID ), + self::QUERY_ACTION => self::STAGE_ACTION, + self::QUERY_STAGE => self::STAGE_VERIFY, + self::QUERY_METHOD => $method, + self::QUERY_PENDING => $this->issue_pending_token( $user->ID ), self::QUERY_STAGE_TOKEN => $stage_token, ); @@ -1607,16 +1651,53 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { /** * Retrieve the sanitized redirect_to parameter from the current request. * + * Falls back to the referring front-end page when the request carries no + * core redirect_to value: membership and custom login pages rarely post + * one, and their own post-login redirects are bypassed by the challenge, + * so without this the user would land in wp-admin after verifying instead + * of returning to the page they logged in from. Only same-site, non-admin + * referers are honored. + * + * @since 1.0.0 + * @since 1.6.11 Added the same-site front-end referer fallback. + * * @return string */ private function get_requested_redirect(): string { // phpcs:disable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended -- redirect_to is a standard WP login parameter; value is passed through esc_url_raw. - if ( ! isset( $_REQUEST['redirect_to'] ) || ! is_string( $_REQUEST['redirect_to'] ) ) { + if ( isset( $_REQUEST['redirect_to'] ) && is_string( $_REQUEST['redirect_to'] ) ) { + return esc_url_raw( wp_unslash( $_REQUEST['redirect_to'] ) ); + } + // phpcs:enable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended + + // The raw referer is used (not wp_get_referer()): login forms posted + // from their own page are self-referrals, which wp_get_referer() + // discards, and the form page is precisely the return target needed. + $raw_referer = wp_get_raw_referer(); + + if ( ! is_string( $raw_referer ) || '' === $raw_referer ) { return ''; } - return esc_url_raw( wp_unslash( $_REQUEST['redirect_to'] ) ); - // phpcs:enable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended + // Same-host URLs only (wp_validate_redirect applies the allowed hosts list). + $validated = wp_validate_redirect( wp_unslash( $raw_referer ), '' ); + + if ( '' === $validated ) { + return ''; + } + + $path = wp_parse_url( $validated, PHP_URL_PATH ); + + if ( ! is_string( $path ) || '' === $path ) { + return ''; + } + + // Never bounce back into admin or the login screen itself. + if ( '/wp-admin' === $path || str_starts_with( $path, '/wp-admin/' ) || '/wp-login.php' === $path || str_ends_with( $path, '/wp-login.php' ) ) { + return ''; + } + + return esc_url_raw( $validated ); } /** @@ -1631,6 +1712,7 @@ class Login_Form_Manager { $login_url = self::get_canonical_login_url( $redirect_to ); $args = array( + self::QUERY_ACTION => self::STAGE_ACTION, self::QUERY_STAGE => self::STAGE_VERIFY, self::QUERY_METHOD => $this->get_requested_method(), ); diff --git a/readme.txt b/readme.txt index 52b5571..f37ab4d 100644 --- a/readme.txt +++ b/readme.txt @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Tags: security, two-factor authentication, login, otp Requires at least: 7.0 Tested up to: 7.2 Requires PHP: 8.3 -Stable tag: 1.6.10 +Stable tag: 1.6.11 License: GPLv3 or later License URI: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html @@ -59,6 +59,15 @@ Yes. Activate the plugin at the network level. Network administrators can set an == Changelog == += 1.6.11 = + +_Release date: 2026-11-04_ + +**Fixed** + +* The 2FA verification screen is no longer hijacked on membership sites that redirect the WordPress login away from wp-login.php (Restrict Content Pro's "Hijack Login URL" and any plugin using the same `login_form_login` redirect pattern). Stage requests now carry a dedicated login action that such redirects cannot intercept, verified end to end on the reported replica: password at the membership page → verification screen → valid code → back on the membership page, logged in. +* Users logging in from front-end forms now return to the page they logged in from after completing 2FA instead of landing in wp-admin. + = 1.6.10 = _Release date: 2026-11-03_ @@ -92,18 +101,6 @@ _Release date: 2026-11-03_ * PHPCompatibility: 8.3-8.6 — 0 issues * PHPUnit: 9.6.38 — 110 tests, 220 assertions -= 1.6.8 = - -_Release date: 2026-09-21_ - -**Added** - -* Administrator visibility when email delivery fails: failed verification-code deliveries record a marker and administrators see a persistent, self-clearing notice ("2FA: email delivery is failing…") in wp-admin and the network admin, since forced-email users cannot sign in while delivery is broken. - -**Fixed** - -* "We could not determine which account you are trying to access" during verification: the pending-stage token was stored in a transient, which external object caches (Redis/Memcached) can evict at any time, killing live verification sessions. Tokens now live in a persistent option map and the error message asks the user to sign in again. - = Previous versions = For the full changelog see the [changelog](https://www.robotstxt.software/plugins/robotstxt-2fa/) page. diff --git a/robotstxt-2fa.php b/robotstxt-2fa.php index a738497..fbd76d3 100644 --- a/robotstxt-2fa.php +++ b/robotstxt-2fa.php @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * Plugin URI: https://www.robotstxt.software/plugins/robotstxt-2fa/ * Update URI: https://www.robotstxt.software/plugins/robotstxt-2fa/ * Description: Adds two-factor authentication to the WordPress login flow. - * Version: 1.6.10 + * Version: 1.6.11 * Author: ROBOTSTXT * Author URI: https://www.robotstxt.software/ * Text Domain: robotstxt-2fa @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) { } if ( ! defined( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_VERSION' ) ) { - define( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_VERSION', '1.6.10' ); + define( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_VERSION', '1.6.11' ); } if ( ! defined( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_FILE' ) ) { diff --git a/vendor/composer/installed.php b/vendor/composer/installed.php index bbb7cc7..ad0b9f3 100644 --- a/vendor/composer/installed.php +++ b/vendor/composer/installed.php @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ 'name' => 'robotstxt/robotstxt-2fa', 'pretty_version' => 'dev-main', 'version' => 'dev-main', - 'reference' => '75d6bdce967002e99e4a4c21df2088277a905e90', + 'reference' => '6a33c6b7caaa03be52487856f8c82810992ac0f1', 'type' => 'wordpress-plugin', 'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../', 'aliases' => array(), @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ 'robotstxt/robotstxt-2fa' => array( 'pretty_version' => 'dev-main', 'version' => 'dev-main', - 'reference' => '75d6bdce967002e99e4a4c21df2088277a905e90', + 'reference' => '6a33c6b7caaa03be52487856f8c82810992ac0f1', 'type' => 'wordpress-plugin', 'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../', 'aliases' => array(),