v1.6.8
This commit is contained in:
parent
c3f0eac50c
commit
1ff471299e
8 changed files with 230 additions and 24 deletions
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@ -1,5 +1,29 @@
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== Changelog ==
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= 1.6.8 =
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_Release date: 2026-09-21_
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**Added**
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* Administrator visibility when email delivery fails: failed verification-code deliveries record a marker and administrators see a persistent, self-clearing notice ("2FA: email delivery is failing…") in wp-admin and the network admin, since forced-email users cannot sign in while delivery is broken. The notice disappears automatically once a code is delivered successfully.
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**Fixed**
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* "We could not determine which account you are trying to access" during verification: the pending-stage token was stored in a transient, which external object caches (Redis/Memcached) can evict at any time, killing live verification sessions. Tokens now live in a persistent option map (capped, pruned, consumed on success, cleaned on uninstall) and the error message now says the session expired and asks the user to sign in again.
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**Compatibility**
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* WordPress: 5.6 – 7.1
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* PHP: 8.0 – 8.5
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**Tests**
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* PHP Coding Standards: PHP_CodeSniffer 3.13.6 / WPCS 3.4.1 — 0 errors
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* PHPStan: level 9 — 0 errors
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* PHPCompatibility: 8.0–8.5 — 0 issues
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* PHPUnit: 9.6.36 — 110 tests, 220 assertions
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= 1.6.7 =
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_Release date: 2026-09-17_
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@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
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namespace Robotstxt\TwoFA;
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use Robotstxt\TwoFA\Login\Email_Code_Sender;
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use Robotstxt\TwoFA\User\Two_Factor_Config;
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if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) {
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@ -61,6 +62,42 @@ class Email_Notifications {
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add_action( self::DIGEST_CRON_HOOK, array( $this, 'send_digest' ) );
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add_filter( 'cron_schedules', array( $this, 'add_cron_schedules' ) );
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add_action( 'init', array( $this, 'maybe_schedule_digest' ) );
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add_action( 'admin_notices', array( $this, 'render_delivery_failure_notice' ) );
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add_action( 'network_admin_notices', array( $this, 'render_delivery_failure_notice' ) );
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}
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/**
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* Warn administrators while verification-code delivery is failing.
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*
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* When a role forces email verification and wp_mail() fails, users are
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* locked out at the login challenge with an error that points them at
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* their administrator — while the real fault is the site's mail
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* configuration. The failure marker is written by
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* {@see Email_Code_Sender} on failed delivery and removed automatically
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* once a code is delivered successfully.
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*
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* @since 1.6.8
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*
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* @return void
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*/
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public function render_delivery_failure_notice(): void {
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if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) {
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return;
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}
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$failure = get_option( Email_Code_Sender::MAIL_FAILURE_OPTION, array() );
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if ( ! is_array( $failure ) || empty( $failure['at'] ) ) {
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return;
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}
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?>
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<div class="notice notice-error robotstxt-2fa-mail-failure">
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<p>
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<strong><?php esc_html_e( '2FA (by ROBOTSTXT): email delivery is failing.', 'robotstxt-2fa' ); ?></strong>
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<?php esc_html_e( 'Verification code emails cannot be sent, so users required to sign in with an email code cannot access the site. Check the site mail or SMTP configuration — this notice disappears automatically once a code is delivered successfully.', 'robotstxt-2fa' ); ?>
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</p>
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</div>
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<?php
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}
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/**
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@ -17,6 +17,13 @@ if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) {
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* Handles generation and delivery of email-based verification codes.
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*/
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class Email_Code_Sender {
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/**
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* Option key recording the last failed delivery attempt. Kept while mail
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* delivery fails so administrators can see why forced-email users cannot
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* sign in; cleared automatically once a code is delivered successfully.
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*/
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public const MAIL_FAILURE_OPTION = 'robotstxt_2fa_last_mail_failure';
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/**
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* Default length of the generated numeric code.
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*/
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@ -187,14 +194,57 @@ class Email_Code_Sender {
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$headers = array( 'Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8' );
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if ( ! wp_mail( $user->user_email, $email_subject, $message, $headers ) ) {
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$this->record_mail_failure( $user->user_email );
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return false;
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}
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$this->clear_mail_failure();
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$this->user_settings_repository->store_email_challenge( $user->ID, $code, $expires );
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* Record a failed verification-code delivery for administrator visibility.
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*
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* When a role forces email verification, a failing wp_mail() locks users
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* out of their accounts with no site-side signal. Store the failure so an
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* admin notice can explain the root cause.
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*
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* @since 1.6.8
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*
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* @param string $to Intended recipient.
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*
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* @return void
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*/
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private function record_mail_failure( string $to ): void {
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$existing = get_option( self::MAIL_FAILURE_OPTION, array() );
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$record = is_array( $existing ) ? $existing : array();
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update_option(
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self::MAIL_FAILURE_OPTION,
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array(
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'at' => time(),
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'to' => $to,
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'count' => ( isset( $record['count'] ) && is_numeric( $record['count'] ) ? (int) $record['count'] : 0 ) + 1,
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),
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false
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);
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}
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/**
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* Clear the delivery failure marker after a successful delivery.
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*
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* @since 1.6.8
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*
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* @return void
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*/
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private function clear_mail_failure(): void {
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delete_option( self::MAIL_FAILURE_OPTION );
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}
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/**
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* Verify a submitted code against the stored challenge.
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*
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@ -85,9 +85,21 @@ class Login_Form_Manager {
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private const FIELD_METHOD = 'robotstxt_2fa_method';
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/**
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* Transient key prefix for pending-stage tokens.
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* Option key storing the pending-stage token map.
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*
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* Maps token => array( user ID, expiry ). Persistent storage instead of a
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* transient: external object caches can evict transients at any time,
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* which would kill live verification stages and lock users out with
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* "We could not determine which account you are trying to access."
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*/
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private const PENDING_TRANSIENT_PREFIX = 'robotstxt_2fa_stage_';
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private const PENDING_OPTION = 'robotstxt_2fa_pending_stages';
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/**
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* Maximum concurrent pending-stage tokens kept in the map.
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*
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* The map is pruned on every write; the cap bounds its size.
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*/
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private const PENDING_MAX_TOKENS = 20;
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/**
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* Pending-stage token TTL in seconds — matches WP nonce lifetime (24 h).
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@ -649,7 +661,7 @@ class Login_Form_Manager {
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$authenticated_user = $this->resolve_pending_user();
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if ( null === $authenticated_user ) {
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return new \WP_Error( 'robotstxt_2fa_unknown_user', __( 'We could not determine which account you are trying to access.', 'robotstxt-2fa' ) );
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return new \WP_Error( 'robotstxt_2fa_unknown_user', __( 'Your verification session expired or could not be found. Please sign in again.', 'robotstxt-2fa' ) );
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}
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// Brute-force: check if the account is currently locked out.
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@ -753,7 +765,7 @@ class Login_Form_Manager {
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// Consume the pending token so it cannot be replayed.
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$pending_token = $this->get_requested_pending_token();
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if ( '' !== $pending_token ) {
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delete_transient( self::PENDING_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $pending_token );
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$this->consume_pending_token( $pending_token );
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}
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$this->user_settings_repository->record_last_verification(
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@ -1333,21 +1345,99 @@ class Login_Form_Manager {
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/**
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* Issue an opaque pending-stage token that maps to a user ID.
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*
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* Stores the user ID in a short-lived transient so the login username
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* is never transmitted in the URL query string.
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* Stores the token in a persistent option map (see PENDING_OPTION) so the
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* login username is never transmitted in the URL query string and object
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* cache eviction cannot kill a live stage.
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*
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* @since 1.3.0
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* @since 1.6.8 Stored in a persistent option map instead of a transient.
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*
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* @param int $user_id User identifier.
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*
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* @return string 32-character alphanumeric token.
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*/
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private function issue_pending_token( int $user_id ): string {
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$tokens = $this->get_pending_token_map();
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$now = time();
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foreach ( $tokens as $existing_token => $data ) {
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if ( $data['e'] <= $now ) {
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unset( $tokens[ $existing_token ] );
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}
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}
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$token = wp_generate_password( 32, false, false );
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set_transient( self::PENDING_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token, $user_id, self::PENDING_TTL );
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$tokens[ $token ] = array(
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'u' => $user_id,
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'e' => $now + self::PENDING_TTL,
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);
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if ( count( $tokens ) > self::PENDING_MAX_TOKENS ) {
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uasort(
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$tokens,
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static function ( array $a, array $b ): int {
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return (int) $a['e'] <=> (int) $b['e'];
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}
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);
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$tokens = array_slice( $tokens, -self::PENDING_MAX_TOKENS, null, true );
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}
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update_option( self::PENDING_OPTION, $tokens, false );
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return $token;
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}
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/**
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* Retrieve the raw pending-stage token map stored in the database.
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*
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* @since 1.6.8
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*
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* @return array<string, array{u: int, e: int}> Token => user ID + expiry.
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*/
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private function get_pending_token_map(): array {
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$raw = get_option( self::PENDING_OPTION, array() );
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if ( ! is_array( $raw ) ) {
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return array();
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}
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$tokens = array();
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foreach ( $raw as $token => $data ) {
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if ( is_string( $token ) && is_array( $data ) && isset( $data['u'], $data['e'] ) && is_numeric( $data['u'] ) && is_numeric( $data['e'] ) ) {
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$tokens[ $token ] = array(
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'u' => (int) $data['u'],
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'e' => (int) $data['e'],
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);
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}
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}
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return $tokens;
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}
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/**
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* Remove a consumed pending-stage token from the map.
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*
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* @since 1.6.8
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*
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* @param string $token Token to consume.
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*
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* @return void
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*/
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private function consume_pending_token( string $token ): void {
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$tokens = $this->get_pending_token_map();
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if ( ! isset( $tokens[ $token ] ) ) {
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return;
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}
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unset( $tokens[ $token ] );
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update_option( self::PENDING_OPTION, $tokens, false );
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}
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/**
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* Retrieve the raw pending-stage token from the current request.
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*
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* Resolve the pending-stage token to its associated WP_User.
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*
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* @since 1.3.0
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* @since 1.6.8 Reads the persistent token map instead of a transient.
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*
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* @return \WP_User|null Null when no valid token is present.
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*/
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return null;
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}
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$user_id_raw = get_transient( self::PENDING_TRANSIENT_PREFIX . $token );
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$data = $this->get_pending_token_map()[ $token ] ?? null;
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if ( ! is_numeric( $user_id_raw ) ) {
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if ( null === $data || $data['e'] <= time() ) {
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return null;
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}
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$user = get_user_by( 'ID', (int) $user_id_raw );
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$user = get_user_by( 'ID', $data['u'] );
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return $user instanceof \WP_User ? $user : null;
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}
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23
readme.txt
23
readme.txt
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Tags: security, two-factor authentication, login, otp
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Requires at least: 5.6
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Tested up to: 7.0
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Requires PHP: 8.0
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Stable tag: 1.6.7
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Stable tag: 1.6.8
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License: GPLv3 or later
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License URI: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html
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@ -59,6 +59,18 @@ Yes. Activate the plugin at the network level. Network administrators can set an
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== Changelog ==
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= 1.6.8 =
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_Release date: 2026-09-21_
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**Added**
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* Administrator visibility when email delivery fails: failed verification-code deliveries record a marker and administrators see a persistent, self-clearing notice ("2FA: email delivery is failing…") in wp-admin and the network admin, since forced-email users cannot sign in while delivery is broken.
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**Fixed**
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* "We could not determine which account you are trying to access" during verification: the pending-stage token was stored in a transient, which external object caches (Redis/Memcached) can evict at any time, killing live verification sessions. Tokens now live in a persistent option map and the error message asks the user to sign in again.
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= 1.6.7 =
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_Release date: 2026-09-17_
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@ -75,15 +87,6 @@ _Release date: 2026-09-17_
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* Forced-enrollment warning on the profile 2FA section: when a user's role enforces 2FA but they have no verification method configured yet, the 2FA section of their profile (wp-admin and the frontend shortcode) opens with a warning notice asking them to activate at least one method. While a grace period is active, the notice appends the remaining days.
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= 1.6.5 =
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_Release date: 2026-09-17_
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**Fixed**
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* Fatal error on the login screen with newer WordPress versions: the `login_message` filter can deliver null when no message is set (observed on WordPress 7.x with PHP 8.4, TypeError on a plain visit to wp-login.php). The message callback now accepts `string|null` and coalesces null to an empty string.
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* Hardened all externally-fed filter callbacks against null payloads: the four `authenticate` callbacks now accept `string|null` credentials (custom REST/SSO endpoints are known to apply the filter with null), and the `wp_redirect` filter callback coalesces a null location.
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= Previous versions =
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For the full changelog see the [changelog](https://www.robotstxt.software/plugins/robotstxt-2fa/) page.
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
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* Plugin URI: https://www.robotstxt.software/plugins/robotstxt-2fa/
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* Update URI: https://www.robotstxt.software/plugins/robotstxt-2fa/
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* Description: Adds two-factor authentication to the WordPress login flow.
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* Version: 1.6.7
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* Version: 1.6.8
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* Author: ROBOTSTXT
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* Author URI: https://www.robotstxt.software/
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* Text Domain: robotstxt-2fa
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}
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if ( ! defined( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_VERSION' ) ) {
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define( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_VERSION', '1.6.7' );
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define( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_VERSION', '1.6.8' );
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}
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if ( ! defined( 'ROBOTSTXT_2FA_FILE' ) ) {
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@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ if ( ! robotstxt_2fa_should_delete_data() ) {
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delete_option( 'robotstxt_2fa_settings' );
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delete_option( 'robotstxt_2fa_failed_log' );
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delete_option( 'robotstxt_2fa_geoip_status' );
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delete_option( 'robotstxt_2fa_pending_stages' );
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delete_site_option( 'robotstxt_2fa_settings' );
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// Clear the GeoIP auto-download cron event.
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4
vendor/composer/installed.php
vendored
4
vendor/composer/installed.php
vendored
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
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'name' => 'robotstxt/robotstxt-2fa',
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'pretty_version' => 'dev-main',
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'version' => 'dev-main',
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'reference' => '2b6e97d03ffbc5f7734bbd30413c979f50de3d15',
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'reference' => '70737383aa72a4fb75363c9d084ec3a7112f8d3b',
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'type' => 'wordpress-plugin',
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'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../',
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'aliases' => array(),
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@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
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'robotstxt/robotstxt-2fa' => array(
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'pretty_version' => 'dev-main',
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'version' => 'dev-main',
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'reference' => '2b6e97d03ffbc5f7734bbd30413c979f50de3d15',
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'reference' => '70737383aa72a4fb75363c9d084ec3a7112f8d3b',
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'type' => 'wordpress-plugin',
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'install_path' => __DIR__ . '/../../',
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'aliases' => array(),
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